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The Negotiator-as-Professional:
Understanding the Competing
Interests of a Representative
Negotiator
Trevor C. W. Farrow'
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is about lawyers as negotiators, and in particular, it is about
identifying and understanding the influential and potentially competing
interests that are - or at least should be - in the minds of lawyers (and
potentially other third party representatives) during the overall negotiation
process. As several commentators have recently and correctly pointed out,
the "overwhelming preponderance" of what lawyers do "involves
negotiating with others.",2 There is little doubt that the bulk of a solicitor's
work involves representative negotiation, whether it is deal-making as a
corporate lawyer, negotiating with suppliers or outside counsel as an in-
house lawyer, working out a divorce settlement as a collaborative family
lawyer, or crafting the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement as a
labour lawyer. Equally important are the tools of negotiation in many
aspects of a litigator's day, including negotiating the terms of a settlement,
plea bargaining, working out the parameters of and approaches to an
advocacy brief with a client, scheduling hearing dates with opposing
counsel, or engaging in a court-annexed dispute resolution session. As Marc
1. Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
tfarrow@osgoode.yorku.ca. I first presented the ideas in this article in a guest lecture in Frederick
H. Zemans' "Lawyer as Negotiator" course at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto on 25 October
2006. 1 am grateful to Allan C. Hutchinson, Frederick H. Zemans, D. Paul Emond, and Colleen M.
Hanycz for comments on an early draft of this article, to Jonathan Finkelstein for research assistance,
and to my students - through numerous research papers and in-class discussions - who have
significantly influenced my thinking in this article.
2. CHARLES B. WIGGINS & L. RANDOLPH LOWRY, NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT
ADVOCACY: A BOOK OF READINGS, 497 (2d ed., 2005).
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Galanter has commented, the work of litigators could more accurately be
described as "litigotiation."3  So what this article is dealing with -
representative negotiation - is the bread and butter of what essentially most
lawyers do most of the time.
While there continues to be an increasing amount of literature on the
mechanics and strategies of negotiation,4 the underlying interests that are
typically at stake in representative negotiations from the perspective of
representatives - particularly negotiations involving lawyers - have not been
adequately studied.5 And until all interests are identified and placed
squarely on the table as active parts to the overall process, representative
negotiation will be less than fully effective, ethical and satisfying as a
process for all those involved, including clients, lawyers and the public.
3. GEORGE W. ADAMS, MEDIATING JUSTICE: LEGAL DISPUTE NEGOTIATIONS, 112-13 (CCH,
2003) (citing Marc Galanter & M. Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1338, 1342 (1994). See also MICHAEL P. SILVER, MEDIATION AND
NEGOTIATION: REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENTS, v (Butterworths, 2001).
4. Perhaps the best-known and still leading example of this literature is ROGER FISHER,
WILLIAM URY BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN,
(2d ed. 1991). For a recent example, see Colleen M. Hanycz, Introduction to the Negotiation
Process Model in COLLEEN M. HANYCZ, FREDERICK H. ZEMANS, & TREVOR C. W. FARROW, THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPRESENTATIVE NEGOTIATION (2008). For general collections, see,
e.g., MICHAEL L. MOFFITT & ROBERT C. BORDONE, THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(Jossey-Bass ed., 2005), MAx H. BAZEMAN, NEGOTIATION, DECISION MAKING AND CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT, (Edward Elgar ed., 2005), JULIE MACFARLANE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: READINGS
AND CASE STUDIES, (2d ed., 2003) For further background materials, see generally Trevor C. W.
Farrow, Dispute Resolution and Legal Education: A Bibliography 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
119 (2005); Trevor C. W. Farrow, Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education
42 ALTA L. REV. 741 (2005); Trevor C. W. Farrow, Review Essay, Thinking About Dispute
Resolution, 41 ALTA L. REV. 559 (2003).
5. For useful starting points, see generally Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The
Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1 (1992); Ronald J.
Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between
Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994); Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal
Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation
Context, 34 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and
Realities - What We Learn From Mediation 56 MOD. L. REV. 361 (1993); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving 31 UCLA L. Rev.
754 (1984). For some recent collections, see generally WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, HANYCZ,
ZEMANS & FARROW, supra note 4; CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND
SETTLEMENT (LexisNexis ed. 2005). See also LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 52-70 (West Publishing 1987); WAYNE P. BRAZEL,
EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES (Prentice-Hall
1988); XAVIER M. FRASCOGNA, JR. & H. LEE HETHERINGTON, NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR
LAWYERS (Prentice-Hall 1984); ROBERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF NEGOTIATION FOR LAWYERS
(Richter Publications 1985). See also KENNETH ARROW, BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION PT.
IV (Norton 1995).
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II. TRADITIONAL VISIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE NEGOTIATOR
The basic role of the lawyer is to do something on behalf of someone
else, typically the client. In the context of representative negotiations, what
is typically being sought is a negotiated deal or settlement that is to the
benefit of the client, not the representative lawyer. Most commentators
contemplate this role of the representative as one of "agent" on behalf of his
or her "principal;"'6 or alternatively as a "surrogate,"7  "affiliate,"8  or
bargaining "representative" on behalf of his or her "constituents."9 Although
each has a slightly different (more or less expansive) meaning of the
relationship, for my purpose the common defining characteristic of all of
these descriptions is that, at the end of the day, the deal is about the client's
interests, not those of the lawyer. And notwithstanding modem negotiation
models that promote cooperative, interest-based approaches,' 0 this vision of
the representative negotiator is still largely influenced by and located in
notions of the lawyer as the client's "zealous advocate"." The problem,
even under these models, is that - as a practical matter - there is much more
at play in the representative negotiator's mind than just what the client cares
about. l2
6. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF
OTHERS: ADVICE TO LAWYERS, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, SPORTS AGENTS, DIPLOMATS, POLITICIANS,
AND EVERYBODY ELSE passim (Sage Publications 1999). See also WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note
2, at 497; Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E. A. Sander, When Should We Use Agents? Direct vs.
Representative Negotiation 4 NEGOT. J. 395 (1988), in WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 501;
Jayne Seminare Docherty & Marcia Caton Campbell, Teaching Negotiators to Analyze Conflict
Structure and Anticipate the Consequences of Principle-Agent Relationships 87 MARQ. L. REV. 655
(2004), in WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 508.
7. See, e.g., WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 516.
8. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 5, at 837 (citing Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering
Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking HARV. L. REV. 637, 660 (1976)),
9. See, e.g., DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 41 (Academic Press, 1981)
[Negotiation Behavior], in, WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 499. See also Docherty &
Campbell, supra note 6; DAVID J. CORRY, NEGOTIATION: THE ART OF MUTUAL GAINS BARGAINING
90 (Canada Law Book, 2000).
10. See, e.g., FISHER, URY, & PATTON, supra note 4, and see generally MACFARLANE, supra
note 4.
11. For a useful discussion of this role, see ADAMS, supra note 3 at 136-47.
12. As Fisher and Ury argue, "Whether it is his employer, his client, his employees, his
colleagues, his family, or his wife, every negotiator has a constituency to whose interests he is
sensitive. To understand that negotiator's interests means to understand the variety of somewhat
differing interests that he needs to take into account." FISHER, URY, & PATTON, supra note 4, at 48.
I am grateful to Colleen M. Hanycz for drawing this passage to my attention.
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To address this deficiency, several discussions of lawyers (or others) as
representative negotiators have expanded this principal-agent vision
somewhat by suggesting that the role of a representative negotiator is
defined not by one but by two interests: the interests of the client and the
interests that are at stake vis-A-vis the bargaining opposite. For example,
Wiggins and Lowry comment that: "As representative negotiators, attorneys
always have two negotiations occurring simultaneously: One with their
bargaining opposite and one with their own client." 13 Further, as Rubin and
Sander question: "What if the agent ... care[s] about his future relationship
with the other agent, and wants to be remembered as a fair and scrupulous
bargainer? How should this conflict get resolved... ? 14
The position occupied by typical representative negotiators under these
sorts of two-interest models is said to be a "boundary-role position," in
which representatives, as Dean Pruitt comments, "can be thought of as
intermediaries whose job is to reconcile the interests of their own and the
opposing organization. They must represent the interests of their
constituents to the opposing representative and represent the views of the
opposing representative to their constituents." 
15
These somewhat expanded treatments of the relevant interests at stake in
representative negotiations - beyond those of simply the representative's
clients - help better to understand the process of representative negotiation
and what actions are and should be taken by representatives on behalf of
their clients in any given context. However, the problem with these
somewhat expanded models is that they still do not paint the full picture of
what is typically going on inside the representative negotiator's mind, and as
such, provide an impoverished view of his or her role, both in terms of its
responsibilities and its potential opportunities.
III. NEGOTIATOR-AS-PROFESSIONAL
To address these deficiencies, I advance an alternative, expansive model
of the representative negotiator that I call the "negotiator-as-professional"
model. It is a model that sees the role of the representative negotiator as
being defined not simply by the client's interests or by the two interests that
are identified by the boundary-role position models, 16 but rather by at least
13. WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 498 (commenting on arguments presented in Rubin
& Sander's "When Should We Use Agents?", supra note 6). See also id. at 497.
14. Rubin & Sander, supra note 6, at 505 (cited to WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2,
emphasis omitted).
15. PRUITT, supra note 9, at 500 (cited to WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2).
16. See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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four sets of interests: client interests, a broad understanding of the
representative's self-interests (that may include, but are not limited to,
interests vis-d-vis the representative negotiator's bargaining opposite),
ethical interests, and the public's interests.
A. Client Interests
1. Interests of the Representative's Client
In any lawyering model, the representative's client maintains one of, and
typically the primary set of interests in the relationship. This is the defining
characteristic of the lawyer-client relationship in the adversary system. 17 In
the context of negotiation, as Rubin and Sander point out, lawyer
representatives bring to the table a particular "expertise" and a "tactical
flexibility" to be used to the benefit of the client.'" Further, according to
Pruitt, the "essence of the representative effect" under the boundary-role
position in negotiation "is trying to please one's constituent" 19 (a task that is
obviously directly dependant on the client's interests). Therefore, as Pruitt
further argues:
[i]t follows that bargainers who are representatives will usually be less conciliatory than
those who are negotiating on their own behalf' and, subject to contrary instructions from
the client, "representatives tend to view their constituents as desiring a tough,
nonconciliatory approach to bargaining of the kind that is produced by a win/lose
orientation. 20
Here we see ourselves largely back to the "zealous advocate" tendency that
foregrounds the interests of the client typically to the exclusion of essentially
everything else.
This model is further articulated in the negotiation context by Robert
Cochran, who argues that not only should representatives tend to "please"
the client, they should also afford a significant amount of deference to the
17. For an historic treatment of the adversary system - and the lawyer's role in that system -
that remains very helpful today, see Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System in Harold J. Berman,
TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW, 32 (New York: Vintage Books, 1961).
18. Rubin & Sander, supra note 6, at 502-03. See also ADAMS, supra note 3, at 136-47.
19. PRUITT, supra note 9, at 501.
20. Id. Because of this tendency, Pruitt argues in favour of representatives being fully
informed of their clients' actual - rather than perceived - interests when approaching negotiations.
See id. See also the findings of David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, "Negotiating Through an
Agent" 35 J. OF CONF. RESOL. 474 (1991).
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client's choices in all aspects of the lawyering process. 21 When looking at
the question of "what choices the client should make," Cochran answers by
advocating that "courts [should] require lawyers to allow clients to make
those choices which a reasonable person, in what the lawyer knows or
should know to be the position of the client, would want to make."2 2 Here
again we see a strong preference for the client's interest as the keystone to
the relationship.
So any model of the role of lawyer-as-negotiator must find a central
position for the client's interests. However, the problem with models that
focus essentially exclusively on the client's interests is that they are not
accurate or honest in their description of what is in reality actually at play in
the minds of representative negotiators, nor do they account for the fact that
representative negotiators do not, and often should not, necessarily align
their interests with those of their clients (or forgo their or other interests) in
the spirit of zealous advocacy. 23 I can say with first-hand experience - as a
litigator and negotiator turned academic - that as a conceptual matter, there
are more interests at play than only those of the client. And as a practical
matter, privileging the interests of the client does not always sit well with
representative negotiators.
An example from a recent negotiation class illustrates these concerns.
In an animated debrief portion of an in-class mock negotiation that I recently
conducted involving the intellectual property rights to artistic materials of
the negotiating parties, a student of mine, after reflecting on the difficulty of
maintaining a negotiation relationship with the other side as well as
maintaining any sense of personal integrity vis-A-vis a very difficult position
she was being asked to advance on behalf of her client, stated in sheer
frustration: "we started from a ridiculous position: our client simply wanted
too much. Her position was [expletive] crazy." The student's frustration
resulted in a significant discussion about the role of the lawyer generally,
and the lawyer-as-negotiator in particular. The easy response to her
concerns was that she was her client's agent, and she could either conduct
the negotiation or get off the file. 24  However, that model - the simple
agency model of lawyering that essentially backgrounds all other interests in
favour of strong client autonomy - did not sit at all well with her.
21. See WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2 (citing Robert F. Cochran, Legal Representation
and the Next Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for Failure to Allow the Client to
Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990)).
22. WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2 (quoting Cochran, supra note 21).
23. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Law and Power in Agency Relationships in MNOOKIN, supra
note 6 at 157 (discussing the diverging interests of principals and agents generally).
24. See infra note 65 (discussing the issue of withdrawal).
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Advancing instructions that in her view were "ridiculous" and "crazy" did
not leave my student with either a good feeling about the specific case or
about her general role as a representative negotiator. For her,
notwithstanding her role as a lawyer-negotiator, there was clearly more at
stake.
Overly client-centric visions of the role of representative negotiator, like
the model advanced by Cochran, do not help with this frustration, which
belies interests at play other than those of the client. So the question then
becomes: Do we need to live with that frustration? Is the zealous advocate
view of the world the right (or only) one, particularly in light of concerns
that leave the representative feeling frustrated, inadequate and perhaps
hamstrung regarding potential alternative approaches and solutions?
Because there are clearly interests other than those of the client that need to
be recognized, the answer to this question, must be no. Before getting to
some objections to this position, 25 and further, to a set of interests involving
the various potential self-interests of the representative negotiator that were
at stake in my student's role-play example, I briefly (below) identify another
set of client interests: those of the opposing client.
2. Other Client's Interests
Because this article deals with the mindset of the representative
negotiator (and not specifically the mindset of principal parties), I do not
spend much time here on the interests of the other side. Thinking about the
interests of negotiation principals - by identifying, maximizing and/or
minimizing mutual interests, creating space for mutual gains, value creating
and value claiming, etc. - is an important subject that is discussed
elsewhere. 26 However, it is obviously important - when thinking about the
competing interests at stake in the mind of the representative lawyer - to
make sure that the other side's interests, in addition to interests vis-A-vis the
bargaining opposite 27 - are on the table.
The typical lawyer-client relationship militates against any
responsibility of the lawyer for the interests of the other side. Further,
zealous advocacy models expressly reject such concerns. And my point here
is not at all to say that the lawyer negotiator is now responsible for the other
25. See, e.g., infra Part IV.
26. See, e.g., supra note 4.
27. Discussed infra in Part IIBI..
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side's interests, particularly when she is also represented. However, to the
extent that alternative negotiation models are considered - for example
strong cooperative models that actively include the other side's interests in
the spirit of maintaining future relationships and mutual gains2 8 or hybrid
models that contemplate the balance of value creation and value claiming2 9 -
consideration for the other side's interests must at least be considered and
discussed with the representative's client. And in any event, regardless of
which negotiation model one follows, modem ethical codes are increasingly
mandating consideration of the other side in the context of truth-telling and
fair play. °
B. Representative Negotiator's Self-Interests
Separate from client interests, there are a number of potential sets of
self-interests at play for the representative in the negotiation process. When
thinking about these interests, it seems to me that there are two questions
that need to be addressed: What kind of negotiator is the representative
(hard, soft, principled, etc.)? And what pecuniary and other self-interests are
at stake? While the representative's ethical interests could also be
considered here, they are instead treated in a separate part of this article.3 1
1. Representative Negotiation Style
On the first question, negotiators must decide if they have the interest
and skill to proceed with one or more negotiation styles,3" and if so, whether
negotiation style is a topic open for discussion with his or her client. Some
negotiators are of the view that they are unable to wear different negotiation
"faces." Again turning to examples from my teaching, several students have
recently indicated to me - in the context of role-plays that require
experimentation with different negotiation styles - that they feel very
uncomfortable putting on a face or playing a role (the competitive
negotiator, the cooperative negotiator, the bad cop, the tough guy, etc.) and
28. See FISHER, URY, & PATTON, supra note 4.
29. See, e.g., HANYCZ, supra note 4; See also David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The
Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Mutual Gain (Free Press, 1986).
30. See infra in Part III.C.2.
31. See infra Part III.C.
32. For a discussion of different negotiation styles, see G. R. Williams, Style and Effectiveness
in Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES FOR MUTUAL GAIN (Lavinia Hall ed., 1993) 151, 156.
See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN
DEALS AND DISPUTES 51-55 (2000); CHERYL PICARD ET AL., THE ART AND SCIENCE OF MEDIATION
69-75 (2004).
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that, in their view, their skills are maximized when they present themselves
as an authentic and principled representative in all cases. Drawing on
personal practical experiences as a litigator and settlement counsel, these
concerns resonate not only in the classroom but also amongst practicing
representatives.
These threshold concerns are typically and ultimately dealt with on a
calculus of competence and context. To the extent that the lawyer
representative and the client think that the lawyer's chosen approach renders
them competent for the negotiation, then all is well: proceeding on the basis
of the lawyer's preferred style, as discussed with the client, is the chosen
course of instruction. To the extent that is not the case, codes of conduct
typically require the lawyer to get off the case and recommend another
representative. Further, in line with scholars who argue that some contexts -
typically including one-off personal injury cases - often lend themselves
better to one negotiating style over another (competitive negotiation for
example),33 it may be that the context of a certain case determines the
required level of competency with a given style. Again, choices will be
made at this threshold stage regarding the approach and the continued
retainer.
If the representative is competent to proceed with one or more of a
variety of different styles, the issue then becomes one of ownership. Who
gets to choose with which style to proceed: the representative or the client?
Here we see the potential of an obvious conflict. As Rubin and Sander
discuss, there is often a potential conflict with a client's instruction (for
example to achieve the best possible outcome in a one-off negotiation
through the use of a competitive approach) and the interest of a
representative negotiator (who would prefer, for example, to retain a
relationship with the negotiator's bargaining opposite by using a cooperative
approach).34  Similarly, Gifford and Pruitt's descriptions of both the
"boundary role position" and the lawyer-as-negotiator position result in the
same potential competing interests between the representative and the
client.35
33. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal
Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT ADVOCACY: A BOOK OF READINGS. supra note 2,
at 521.
34. See Rubin & Sander, supra note 6 at 505.
35. See Gifford, supra note 5, at 835; PRUIT, supra note 9, at 500; see also WIGGINS &
LOWRY, supra note 2, at 498, SILVER, supra note 3, at 75.
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Now before I get into further discussion of this potential conflict, it
should be recognized that even though the potential of competing interests
exists, there does not necessarily need to be a conflict. Clearly a good
relationship between the representative negotiator and the bargaining
opposite can militate to the benefit of both the representative lawyer and the
client. As Gifford recognizes, negotiating fairly with the other side does not
mean a "selling-out" of the client's interests.3 6 Similarly, Pruitt argues that
developing relationships with the other side can help both with the client's
immediate outcome as well as potentially with future negotiations: "Because
they communicate with one another over a period of time and share similar
organizational positions, representatives often develop ties to one another.
These ties can contribute to the reconciliation of conflicts that would
otherwise be intractable."37
However, when interests do not align, the potential of conflict between
the representative and the client is real and very typical. In these
circumstances, the client-centered "zealous advocate" model advocates for
the backgrounding of the representative's interests in favour of the client's
preferences. This view of the negotiator's role fits Robert Cochran's model.
For Cochran, if the representative lawyer viewed that a cooperative approach
was appropriate, but the client preferred a competitive approach (perhaps in
the context of a one-off real estate purchase for the client who does not
anticipate being in a similar market position again), the client's preferences
should prevail. According to Cochran, regardless of the lawyer's preference
vis-A-vis the bargaining opposite, the client has a "right to choose the
negotiating style."38
On the traditional lawyer-client relationship model, this view is not
controversial. In fact, it is still largely the dominant view.3 9 The lawyer's
role is to carry out the wishes of the client - period. As the argument goes,
any other view of the role of the lawyer usurps a meaningful sense of client
autonomy; and further, particularly given the virtual monopoly of power that
lawyers have over the provision of increasingly essential legal services, any
other view would essentially create an all-powerful oligarchy of lawyers. °
36. Gifford, supra note 5, at 837; see also Gifford, infra note 106.
37. Pruitt, supra note 9, at 500.
38. See Cochran, supra note 21, at 540. For a useful discussion regarding the importance of
context regarding the choice of negotiation style and strategy, see Gifford, supra note 33, at 521-23.
39. See, e.g., infra notes 59-60 and surrounding text.
40. Because I have written elsewhere on these arguments - see infra note 58 - 1 will not take
them up further here. For a useful account of this argument, see, e.g., Rob Atkinson, How the Butler
Was Made To Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of The Remains of the Day, 105 YALE L.J. 177,
189 (1995) in which he argues:
382
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The problem with this unsubtle view of legal representation, however, is that
it is not fully supported in the literature or in codes of conduct, 41 and further,
it ignores the daily reality of the negotiation process. Of course
representatives will have interests. And so the question becomes: Why
should those interests always take a back seat, particularly in cases - like the
one involving my student - in which a client's position is "ridiculous?" In
these circumstances, should lawyers be obligated to ignore their own views
and interests and advance a "ridiculous" position? My view is that such an
argument disingenuously ignores the reality of what actually goes on in the
world of negotiations. Such an argument conveys an impoverished view of
lawyering that does not make room for a representative's own views,
interests and experiences in a given situation that may, at the end of the day,
work to the benefit of the client's cause.42  This ultimately cheapens the
overall negotiation process to one that alienates negotiators - like my student
- who are looking for a meaningful place to practice their skills in a
professional, reasonable and fulfilling way. Further, to the extent that codes
of conduct prohibit the advancement of "frivolous ' 43 or "useless legal
proceedings", 44 query whether advancing a "ridiculous" position amounts to
unprofessional conduct.
The boundary-role position approach described by scholars like Pruitt
and Gifford allows for the reality of potentially competing interests in the
mind of the representative negotiator that zealous advocacy models tend to
ignore. So when thinking about the potential interests at stake when
preparing for a negotiation, the boundary-role position approach paints a
more realistic landscape for the representative negotiator. At least now the
tension in my student's mind has a voice and a place in the dialogue of
negotiation preparation. And by actively recognizing these potentially
The lawyer's job is to advise the client, faced with a bafflingly complex legal order... Not
to assist the client in exercising autonomy up to the very margin allowed by law would be
to usurp the role not just of judge and jury, but of the legislature as well. Ultimately, it
would undermine the legitimacy of government itself.
41. See infra notes 66-70 and surrounding text.
42. 1 have been influenced here by ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, LEGAL ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2006).
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2006).
44. CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT ch. 111(6) (2006) (Can.) (stating the rules adopted by the
Canadian Bar Association ("CBA")) (hereinafter "CPC"). See also RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT R. 2.02(2) (2000) (Can.) (stating the rules adopted by the Law Society of Upper Canada
("LSUC") (hereinafter "RPC").
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competing interests, the lawyer can strategize about how to resolve them.45
In a purely zealous advocacy model, these considerations are left off the
table (or are at least the elephants in the room that no one is meant to talk
about).
So far we have identified the client's interests and the representative's
self-interests largely relating to negotiation styles vis-A-vis the bargaining
opposite. It is with these interests that the current boundary role position
schools of thought leave us. And because these schools of thought consider
more than simply the client's interests - they are an improvement on the
typically one-dimensional client-centered views of the zealous advocate.
However, there are other interests at stake that still need to be considered as
part of the representative's self-interests as well as other interests involving
ethics and the public.46
2. Pecuniary and Other Self-Interests
In addition to style and the representative's reputation vis-A-vis the
bargaining opposite, there are other potentially thorny self-interests at stake
- particularly when negotiating settlements in the context of litigation - that
should be identified and put on the table as issues to be acknowledged and
considered when preparing for a representative negotiation. So the second
question that needs to be asked under this discussion of the representative
negotiator's self-interests is: What pecuniary and other self-interests are at
stake and what is the client willing to do about them?
Wiggins and Lowry have articulated that negotiating attorneys and their
clients "are like allies in warfare. Outwardly they may have an identity of
goals and are bound together by professional obligations; yet internally they
may have divergent interests and inconsistent long term objectives., 47  A
number of potential conflicting interests arise in these circumstances. For
example, to the extent that a piece of litigation is worth much more to the
lawyer as a going concern as opposed to a settled case, there are incentives
to keep the case alive and advise against settlement. 48 Along these lines, the
lawyer-as-potential-settlement-negotiator may also be much less risk averse
when it comes to recommending trial over settlement, given potential desires
for trial experience, exposure to the press, significant contingency fee
rewards (which admittedly can cut both ways), and internal firm or
community respect for being a tough, court-ready litigator (that also may be
45. For a discussion about potentially irreconcilably competing interests, see infra Part IV.
46. Discussed infra in Parts III C-D.
47. WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 517.
48. For a brief discussion on this issue, see SILVER, supra note 3, at 75.
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based, at least in tournament discourse, on the desire to be thought of as
"partnership material" 49). The choice of payment structures - for example
percentage of outcome vs. hourly rate - may also impact a representative's
interests vis-A-vis approaching a negotiation.5 °
The underlying interests that raise these concerns are real and should be
put on the table and considered in the context of full, sophisticated
negotiation preparations. And typically there are solutions. Unlike self-
interests based on the representative's reputation, purely financial self-
interests are relatively easy to deal with. Codes of conduct typically paint
rather bright conflict of interest lines in these areas that allow (or require)
lawyers, after recognizing the issues, to background their financial interests
in the spirit of the very notion of lawyering itself.5' When it comes to some
of the other, more personal or subtle concerns - undiluted focus on the trial
process, a need to maintain a tough and ready litigation pose, etc. - there are
other solutions, in addition to codes of conduct that require attorneys to
consider settlement,52 which assist with potentially competing interests. For
example, the use of parallel settlement counsel as a way not to distract the
focused litigator from his or her endgame is a process - based on the
literature 53 and on my first-hand experience with the use of settlement
49. For a general discussion of tournament theory in the context of law firm hierarchies and
decision-making processes, see, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF
LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991). For a critique of this discussion,
see, e.g., David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking,
Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms 84 VA. L. REV.
1581 (1998).
50. Some of these concerns are contemplated in: WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 517,
Rubin & Sander supra note 6, at 505; Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study
of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial in, NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT
ADVOCACY, supra note 2, at 525, 530; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, How Would
You Like to Pay for That? The Strategic Effects of Fee Arrangements on Settlement Terms in
NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT ADVOCACY, supra note 2, at 553-54; Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee
Arrangements and Negotiation in NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT ADVOCACY, supra note 2, at
552.
51. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2006)., Further, as Chomenki and
Hart argue, "Good lawyers... recognize their natural self-interest on the matter of fees, particularly
in contingency cases, and deal with the matter as clearly and comprehensively as they can."
GENEVIEVE A. CHORNENKI & CHRISTINE E. HART, BYPASS COURT: A DISPUTE RESOLUTION
HANDBOOK 142 (3d ed., 2005).
52. See, e.g., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ch. 111(6) (2006) (Can.).
53. See, e.g., William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel (1999) 14 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 367; see also James Freund, Bridging Troubled Waters: Negotiating Disputes in
NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT ADVOCACY supra note 2, at 518, 520.
counsel in complex civil litigation settlements - that can work quite
effectively.
Complicating (and clouding) these potential conflicting interests is the
lawyer's inability to understand, or willful blindness to, what the client's
interests (and other interests) actually are at the outset, as opposed to what
the lawyer assumes (or wants) them to be. As Leonard Riskin recognized,
the traditional zealous advocate tendency - based on the "lawyer's standard
philosophical map" - blinds the lawyer to a number of things including the
potential needs of the client that may not be "legally meaningful," including
many non-financial issues relating to "honor, respect, dignity, security, and
love ... To assist with this impoverished tendency of the traditional
advocate, particularly in favour of promoting the benefits of mediation,
Riskin argues in favour of expanding the traditional map. All interests, and
not simply those located on the adversarial map, need to be taken into
account and understood as part of the lawyer's role as a representative. As I
have recently argued elsewhere, education, an open-mindset, and a shift in
the adversarial culture are all already leading to these ideals becoming more
of a reality. "
C. Representative Lawyer's Ethical Interests
According to a March 2006 statement by Brian A. Tabor, Q.C.,
President of the CBA: "Standards of professional ethics form the backdrop
for everything lawyers do."5 6 As such, any model of lawyering - including
lawyers as negotiators - must actively embrace interests of an ethical nature.
Therefore, in addition to reputational, pecuniary, and other self-interests,
there are also significant (potentially related) ethical interests of the
representative negotiator that need to be carefully considered in the context
of developing the negotiator-as-professional model. There are two points of
discussion here. The first, fundamental point deals with the relevance of the
representative negotiator's own moral code. The second point deals with
other ethical interests at play in a representative negotiation.
54. Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers 43 OHIO ST. L. J. 29, 44 (1982); see also
Docherty & Campbell, supra note 6.
55. See Trevor C. W. Farrow, Globalizing Approaches to Legal Education and Training:
Canada to Japan 38 HOSE RIRON J. OF L. & POL. 144 (2005); FARROW, supra note 4.
56. See CPC, supra note 44, at "President's Message."
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1. What Kind of Lawyer is the Representative Negotiator?
The basic question that I am interested in here is: What kind of lawyer is
the representative negotiator? Is the negotiator a zealous advocate driven
solely by the client's self-interest; or is the negotiator an agent whose moral
outlook also counts in the calculus of the principal-agent relationship,
particularly regarding the kinds of cases taken, the results sought, and the
tools used? This question - that goes to the heart of professionalism itself -
has been nicely framed by Rob Atkinson:
Should a professional always do all that the law allows, or should the
professional recognize other constraints, particularly concerns for the
welfare of third parties? This question divides scholars of legal ethics and
thoughtful practitioners into two schools: those who recognize constraints
other than law's outer limit, and those who do not.
Because I have written elsewhere on this topic relating to lawyers
generally, 58 I will only briefly develop the basic issues here as they relate
specifically to the representative negotiator. As a preliminary matter, there
continue to be strong arguments for following Atkinson's second school:
what counts is what is legal, and non-legal considerations - including a
lawyer's personal ethical interests - are not relevant in terms of the lawyer's
representation of his or her client. Traditional and still dominant views of
the lawyer's role as a zealous advocate - as reinforced by codes of conduct59
and academic literature regarding the lawyer's role in general60 and the
negotiator's role in particular 61 - support this school of thought.
57. Atkinson, supra note 40, at 184 (footnote omitted).
58. See Trevor C. W. Farrow, Ethical Lawyering in Theory and in Practice (forthcoming).
59. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 43, at pmbl. ("As advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system"), CPC, supra note 44 at ch. IX
(rule) ("When acting as an advocate, the lawyer must...represent the client resolutely, honourably
and within the limits of the law"). See also, R. 4.01:
The lawyer has a duty to the client to raise fearlessly every issue, advance every
argument, and ask every question, however distasteful, which the lawyer thinks will help
the client's case and to endeavour to obtain for the client the benefit of every remedy and
defence authorized by law... [w]hen acting as an advocate, a lawyer should refrain from
expressing the lawyer's personal opinions on the merits of a client's case.
60. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 17; Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); MONROE H. FRIEDMAN,
LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975). For a very useful debate on the limits of the
adversarial system and the role of the lawyer, compare Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral
Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 637 (1986)
with David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper AM. BAR FOUND.
The problem is that, notwithstanding this dominant school of thought,
some representative negotiators, as a practical matter, are persuaded by
Atkinson's other school of thought: that non-legal considerations - again
including a lawyer's personal ethical interests - should not be irrelevant.
Again drawing on examples from my teaching, many students are
uncomfortable with the notion of negotiating deals, the underlying ethical
consequences of which they fundamentally disagree with. 62  For instance,
going back to my original example of the negotiation student who was
representing a client with ridiculous and crazy instructions in an hypothetical
role-play, when pushed in the de-brief session on whether she would take
that case, she responded: "I'm not sure, if I had a choice, that I would work
for someone like my client in the negotiation ... she's an egomaniac."
Fortunately, representative negotiators do have a choice. So the
question then becomes: Why should we pursue a model of professionalism
that requires representative negotiators to negotiate deals on behalf of their
clients that they would never negotiate for themselves or in any event that
they think are ridiculous? The answer in my view is that we should not.
Clearly there are times, particularly after a retainer has been accepted and
negotiations are under way, when the lawyer may be asked to take positions
professionally that he or she would not take personally.63  But these
situations aside, there are many occasions when the lawyer's interests and
views should be voiced in the spirit of improving the underlying cause as
well as the overall system, notwithstanding an individual client's initial
desires. In this spirit, Allan Hutchinson, for example, argues for a model
that does not require lawyers "to forgo moral judgment", for to do otherwise
RES. J. 637 (1986), and Andrew L. Kaufman, A Commentary on Pepper's "The Lawyer's Amoral
Ethical Role" AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 657 (1986). See also Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to
Professors Kaufinan and Luban AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 657 (1986); Abe Krash, Professional
Responsibility to Clients and the Public Interest: Is There a Conflict?, in PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING PROFESSION, supra note 66, at 445.
61. See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 21.
62. Such examples include the following hypothetical negotiations. (1) A rich, speculative,
private land developer asks you to negotiate a deal with a slum landlord over the purchase of a fully-
functioning low income rental facility that currently houses 80 families in favour of its demolition
and replacement with a high-end multi-use condo facility that would house 8 high income families.
(I have been influenced by Duncan Kennedy regarding this hypothetical. See Duncan Kennedy, The
Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of Their Causes, 18 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1157, 1162 (1987).
(2) The CEO of a large privately-held downsizing transnational security firm asks you to negotiate a
deal that would result in the termination of all employees of the Jewish or Muslim faith, based on
your client's unfounded occupational requirement theory that these employees, while "good people",
simply pose too much of a reputational and security risk (in terms of attacks against security officers
in the field) and therefore are too costly to the firm.
63. For a general discussion, see, e.g., id. See also the brief discussion on the topic of the
timing of withdrawal, infra at note 65.
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reduces them to "amoral technicians with significant drawbacks and
limitations . . . ."64 What this looks like in practice is making choices about
what negotiations a representative takes, and what tools and negotiation
styles they are willing to use once a client is taken on. Of course this is all
done with the client's knowledge and instructions. And if instructions are
not forthcoming, the lawyer should get off the file.65
Before we dismiss all of this as moral meandering without a sound basis
in legal policy, we should also recognize that professional codes of conduct
- as supported by competing academic literature66 - support the relevance of
a lawyer's morality, sense of justice, honour, and ethics. For example,
according to the preamble and scope of the Model Rules: "the Rules do
not.., exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a
lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by
legal rules. ' 67 The CPC states: the "lawyer should not hesitate to speak out
against an injustice. ' ,68  Similar considerations regarding the relevance of
broad' notions of morality and honour obtain in various regional
jurisdictions. For example, according to The Lawyer's Code of Professional
Responsibility (LCPR) of the New York State Bar Association ("NYSBA"),
"A lawyer should be temperate and dignified, and refrain from all illegal and
morally reprehensible conduct., 69 Further, according to the preface of the
Code of Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Alberta ("LSA"): "the
64. Allan C. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics for a Fragmented Society: Between Professional and
Personal, in THE CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 157 (Janet Walker gen. ed.,
6th ed. 2005).
65. It is acknowledged that getting off a file is more difficult, although certainly not
impossible, once a negotiation has commenced or is imminent. Ideally, then, if withdrawal is seen
as an option, it should occur with the client's consent, or at least with the client's full knowledge, as
soon as possible in the life of the representative-client relationship prior to a negotiation.
66. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 62; Hutchinson, supra note 64, Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another view of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, supra note 5. See also
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, in PROBLEMS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING PROFESSION, supra note 60, at 4, Luban, supra
note 60; Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV..
669, 671. See also id. at 690-95, (arguing, among other things, that in lawyering situations in which
arbiters are not present - expressly invoking the lawyer's role as a "negotiator" or "counselor" - the
"non-advocate lawyer should be held morally accountable for assistance rendered the client even
though the lawyer is neither legally nor professionally accountable").
67. MODEL RULES, supra note 43, at pmbl. See also id. at 7, 9.
68. CPC, supra note 44, at ch. XIII.3.
69. NYSBA, LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1, EC 1-5,
available at, http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Attorney Resources/EthicsOpinions/
Lawyers.Code of ProfessionalResponsibility/CodeofResponsibility.pdf.
rules and regulations... cannot exhaustively cover all situations that may
confront a lawyer, who may find it necessary to also consider ... general
moral principles in determining an appropriate course of action. '
Although not uncontroversial, there is therefore a tension even within
the various codes of conduct between the responsibility to zealously
represent a client and the potential role for the lawyer's own ethical interests,
whether based on morality, a sense of honour or some other social norm.
Regardless, there is clearly a basis for the relevance of- and in my view an
overriding professional obligation at least to consider - the lawyer's own
ethical interests in the context of his or her role as a representative
negotiator.
As such, these interests - which are not recognized by either the simple
client-centered models or the more expanded boundary role position models
of representative negotiation - should be recognized as interests that
influence the lawyering and negotiation processes and, as such, need to be
on the table for discussion when the negotiator-as-professional sits down to
prepare for the representative negotiation process. The end calculus
becomes a discussion between the representative lawyer and the client.7'
The final decision of whether to stay with the representative always rests
with the client. But the fundamental decisions regarding whether and how
the negotiation is handled are also decisions regarding which the lawyer
should have determining input. Any other model, not only turns a blind eye
to reality, but also impoverishes the responsibilities and possibilities of the
representative's role.
2. Other Ethical Interests of the Representative Negotiator
In addition to the fundamental question of the relevance of the
representative negotiator's personal moral compass, there are other ethical
issues that come up all the time in representative negotiations that need to be
considered and discussed with the client. Gifford, when discussing the
boundary role position model, does contemplate the notion of professional
responsibility in passing:
When negotiating on behalf of the client the lawyer is drawn in conflicting directions.
On the one hand, she is obligated professionally to obtain the most favorable settlement
70. LSA, Code of Professional Conduct, available at, LSA
http://www.lawsocietyalberta.com/files/Code.pdf, at preface. See also RPC, supra note 44, at r.
4.01(2)(b) (although pitched to lawyers in their capacity as advocates, this rule provides that: "a
lawyer shall not .... knowingly assist or permit the client to do anything that the lawyer considers to
be ... dishonourable ... ").
71. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 813-17.
390
[Vol. 7: 3, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
possible during the negotiations ... On the other hand ... he must respond to pressures
from his negotiating counterparts. . and pursue settlements that are fair and just to both
parties. The pressure on the lawyer to accommodate these tensions ... results in part
from the expectations of future contact with the other lawyers and in part from the
traditional courtesy andfair play among lawyers.72
While this is right, ethical considerations involve more than simply
"courtesy and fair play among lawyers." Terms like "courtesy," "fair play,"
and - as Silver articulates, the "duty of 'good faith' towards other counsel"73
- are unlikely to be precise enough, or wide-reaching enough, to place
adequate limits on "dishonest bargaining practices" 74 and other such
negotiation tactics. What we are therefore talking about, in addition to "fair
play", etc., is a full range of ethical and professional considerations,
including obligations of confidentiality, truth-telling, the avoidance of
conflicts of interest, and the like. Neither the client-centered model nor the
boundary role position model adequately and expressly embraces a full
consideration of the representative negotiator's ethical considerations and
interests.
That is because, surprisingly, the consideration of ethics continues to be
a relatively new issue in negotiation theory. As Eleanor Norton comments,
"[t]here has been little evidence of or interest in coherent standards or
express norms for appropriate behavior in negotiations., 75  Similarly, as
Lynn Epstein comments: "[n]egotiations have always enjoyed a certain
amount of protection from ethical constraints. This protection is due to a
longstanding tradition of allowing parties to negotiate freely, and without
restrictions that encompass other aspects of legal representation.
Historically, this freedom surrounded most negotiations in a shroud of
secrecy., 76 Although there is starting to be more focus recently on ethics
and negotiation,7 7 Epstein's description still largely obtains. Often when
72. Gifford, supra note 5, at 835-36 (emphasis added).
73. SILVER, supra note 3, at 76-77.
74. Id.
75. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethics of Process 64 N.Y.U.L. REV. 493, 506
(1989) in WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 594,
76. Lynn A. Epstein, Cyber E-Mail Negotiation vs. Traditional Negotiation: Will Cyber
Technology Supplant Traditional Means of Settling Litigation? 36 TULSA L. J. 839 at 845 (2001), in
WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 544.
77. See, e.g., WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael
Wheeler eds., 2004); DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE (Phyllis E. Bernard
& Bryant Garth eds., 2002); HANYCZ ET AL, supra note 4; MACFARLANE, supra note 4, at 258-80;
WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 497, 589-45; CRAVER, supra note 5, at ch. 17; SILVER, supra
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ethics are raised, it is typically done in passing,'8 as an afterthought, or at
least as a separate discussion that does not form part of the central make-up
of the representative negotiator's very being as a professional.79
This inadequate treatment of ethics jeopardizes the adequate training,
ethical preparation and professional conduct of representative negotiators.
As Wiggins and Lowry have argued, "there is a clear potential for conflict
between the attorney's own values and the perceived duty of single-minded
zealous advocacy on behalf of the client's interests."'  Shockingly, this
impoverished state of affairs - that results in a "confounding [of] the
boundary of professional responsibility and negotiation ethics" - apparently
makes it "difficult to ... make prescriptive statements about truth telling and
lawyers."'" These acknowledgments amount, in my view, to a remarkably
sad state of affairs. If lawyers cannot be counted on, or at least mandated to
tell the truth, who can? What we are left with then is a relatively barren
ethical terrain that leaves the representative negotiator without adequate
guidance for ethical negotiation. 2  Current practices encourage Gross and
note 3, at 77, n.15; MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 274-94; ANDREW J. PIRIE, ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: SKILLS, SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 122-24 (2000); ADAMS, supra note 3, at
136-46. See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER & NANCY H. ROGERS, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES (Aspen 4th ed., 2003); Kimberlee
K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics Must Keep Pace With Practice: Plurality in Lawyering Roles Demands
Diverse and Innovative Ethical Standards 39 IDAHO L. REV. 399 (2003); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
The Lawyer's Obligation to Be Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV.
181 (1981); Gary T. Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining By Lawyers, 2
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (1988), David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, Three Ethical Issues in
Negotiation, NEG. J. 363 (1986); James M. Bowie, Ethical Issues in Construction Mediation: Are
There Any Rules?, 24 CONSTR. LAWYER 33 at n.1 (2004); J. Keith Mumighan, D. A. Cantelon & T.
Elyashiv, Bounded Personal Ethics and the Tap Dance of Real Estate Agency, in Advances in
Qualitative Organizational Research 1, vol.3 (J.A. Wagner Ill, J.M. Bartunek & K. D. Elsbach, eds.,
2001) (also noted in MNOOK[N & SUSSKIND, supra note 6, at 286-87).
78. For example, in the index of a leading collection of essays on the issue of representative
negotiation, the topic of "ethics" has only two references, both of which simply refer to discussions
about agents' ethics in passing (and neither of which is directly related to the ethical obligations of
lawyers as representative negotiators). See MNOOKIN & SUSSKIND, supra note 6, at 320. In another
text on representation in mediation and negotiation, "ethics" has no references in the index. See
SILVER, supra note 3, at 199 (other than the term "good faith", which has one entry, and has been
discussed supra at note 73 and accompanying text).
79. Although far from determinative evidence of the relative importance of legal ethics vis-A-
vis other negotiation topics, in one of the leading casebooks on the subject of negotiation (WIGGINS
& LOWRY, supra note 2), the issue of ethics - although raised briefly in passing (see, e.g., WIGGINS
& LOWRY, supra note 2, at 497) - is raised in chapter 16 of 16 chapters. Similarly, "Negotiation
Ethics" is chapter 17 of 17 chapters in CRAVER, supra note 5.
80. WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 589.
81. Id.
82. For professional obligation requirements, see, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 43, at
pmbl., para. 2, (providing that "as negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but
consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others."); See also id.. at r. 4.1; For a summary
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Syverud, for example, to ask questions such as: "Under what circumstances
should a party make a sincere offer? An outrageous demand? An insincere
threat to go to trial?" 83  Further, for example, Norton comments that "the
concept of truthfulness in negotiation raises unique ethical questions because
in most circumstances candor is not necessarily required., 8 4  Silver
articulates that representative lawyers "can be misleading, can bluff and can
threaten action at will." 85  Further, Boulle and Kelly argue that, even for
lawyers governed by professional codes of conduct, "in negotiation...
exaggeration and sheer puffery are tolerated., 86  As such, Wiggins and
Lowry question whether "the profession should attempt to police lying in
negotiation" at all. 87
This ethically questionable state of affairs in representative negotiation
should not be tolerated, particularly for representative negotiators who are
also members of the bar and subject to professional obligations. The
negotiator-as-professional must actively embrace ethical problems, both in
preparation with the client and then during the negotiation process itself.
And to the extent that a client seeks to foreground her personal interests over
the ethical concerns and interests of the representative negotiator, that move
must be either rejected through active discussions with the client - which
often in any event work to the benefit of the client's case 88 - or the lawyer
and treatment of the Model Rules and proposals regarding negotiation and professionalism, see, e.g.,
ABA, Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, "Lawyer's Obligation of
Truthfulness When Representing a Client in Negotiation: Application to Caucused Mediation"
(Formal Ethics Opinion 06-439, 12 April 2006), Mediation and Negotiation, supra note 3, at 77; For
a background discussion, see generally WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 597-600; In Canada,
see CPC, supra note 44, at ch. 111(7), (providing that "[w]hen advising the client the lawyer must
never knowingly assist in or encourage any dishonesty...", and further ibid. at chs. 1(5)(g), (h), and
in the context of the lawyer as advocate, chs. IX(2)(e), (3). See also RPC, supra note 44, at r.
2.02(5). Cf LSA, Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 70, at ch. 11 ("The Lawyer as
Negotiator") (providing a wide-ranging set of ethical prescriptions for lawyer negotiators). For
comment on the LSA's position, see Mediation and Negotiation, supra note 3, at 77, n. 15.
83. GROSS & SYVERUD, supra note 50, at 327.
84. NORTON, supra note 75, at 508. But cf Model Rules, supra note 43, at R. 4.1.
85. SILVER, supra note 3, at 77.
86. LAURENCE BOULLE & KATHLEEN J. KELLY, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES, PROCESSES,
PRACTICE 158, (Candn. ed., Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1998).
87. WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 590.
88. See CORRY, supra note 9, at 88 (stating that "[i]f informal conferences [in the bargaining
process] are to be successful ... research has shown that... t]he negotiator must speak truthfully in
indicating areas of flexibility in the party's position."). See also ADAMS, supra note 3, at 139-46;
See generally PEPPET & TULUMELLO, supra note 32, at 284 (giving further treatment of the issue of
discussing ethical issues "explicitly" with clients).
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must get off the file in accordance with principles of professionalism. In my
view there is no middle ground. James White has argued that much of the
difficulty in regulating negotiation behaviour comes from the fact that
"negotiation is a non-public behaviour." 89 That may be right as a descriptive
matter. However, we do not seem to have an appetite for accepting
borderline ethical behaviour in law's public sphere. We should be even less
accommodating of such behaviour in the private sphere. 90
D. The Public's Interests
The fourth general set of interests at play in representative negotiations
includes the public's interest. While notions of personal morality and ethical
considerations 91 are bound up with notions of the public good, particularly
in the context of the regulation of lawyers, a further question also needs to
be considered: should a representative negotiator consider, during
deliberations with the client, the public worth of a given outcome of the
negotiation process? In my view, the answer is yes for the negotiator-as-
professional.
Here again traditional models of representative negotiation are either
actively against these sorts of public-welfare considerations (based in
zealous advocacy principles) or essentially silent. A typical example of this
opposition is the following statement by Abe Krash: a lawyer's "views of the
public interest are immaterial to his [or her] professional responsibility.1
92
For Riskin, the basic reason for this opposition or silence is that models of
lawyering that celebrate the zealous advocate blind the lawyer to, or
mandate against, a number of considerations including "the overall social
effect of a given result.
93
In opposition to this indifference, Duncan Kennedy - on the theory that
lawyers should "[t]ry ... [their] best ... to avoid doing harm with. . . their]
lawyer skills" - argues that lawyers "shouldn't take the case if... they] think
it would be better for society, or more moral, for the client to lose.
' 94
Similarly, Allan Hutchinson argues for a "fresh account of legal ethics [that]
would... encourage lawyers to develop a critical morality that encompasses
such pressing issues as 'what kind of lawyer do I want to be?' and 'what
89. James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation
(1980) AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 926 (1980) (cited in WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at 595).
90. See, e.g., LSA, supra note 70, at ch. 11. See also MODEL RULES, supra note 43, at pmbl.,
para. 2.
91. See, e.g., infra Part III.C.
92. RIKSIN, supra note 60, at 449 (citing Krash, supra note 60).
93. RISKIN, supra note 54, at 44 (footnote omitted).
94. KENNEDY, supra note 62, at 206-07 (citing Krash, supra note 60).
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interests am I going to spend my life serving as a lawyer?.' 95 Finally, at the
1971 "Excellence in Advocacy" program of the Advocacy Institute, held in
Ann Arbor, Michigan, the celebrated author Martin Mayer argued that:
[l]f lawyers cannot look at the society as a whole and say that certain aspects of their
work ... represent a plus for this society and for the world of our children, then they had
better look to last-ditch defenses. Better yet, lawyers should try to find a way to salvage
what is worth doing out of their work and be influential in the production of what is
going to happen next.
9 6
Again, these are certainly not uncontroversial positions, particularly
given the underpinnings of the dominant zealous advocate model located in
strong notions of a freedom-seeking adversary system. But they are
positions, again, that certainly find support in current codes of conduct. For
example, the CBA states that the "primary concern" of the CPC is "the
protection of the public interest. '  Accordingly, "the lawyer should not
hesitate to speak out against an injustice. " 98  So to the extent that a
representative negotiator is being asked to take a position that she considers
not to be in the "public interest" or that amounts to an "injustice" (terms that
are not typically defined in codes of conduct), then she is professionally
encouraged to seek alternative solutions and/or to "speak out." In my view
these alternatives specifically include speaking out during negotiation
preparation sessions with a client who is trying to advance a cause that
amounts, in the eyes of the lawyer, to an "injustice;" or in the eyes of my
negotiation student, to something that is "ridiculous." This will obviously be
context and lawyer specific. But that is OK. And it is certainly not a reason
to shy away from the opportunity to do good, or at least to avoid doing harm,
with a representative's negotiation skills. That is the opportunity and the
responsibility of the negotiator-as-professional.
E. Other Interests
I have raised four basic sets of interests that I think must be considered
by representative negotiators when approaching any given client's retainer.
In addition, there may be other interests, including competing interests of
95. HUTCHINSON, supra note 64, at 157 (citing WALKER, supra note 64).
96. Martin Mayer, The Trial Lawyers, in EXCELLENCE IN ADVOCACY 51, 60 (Grace W.
Holmes ed., 1971).
97. CPC, supra note 44, at Preface.
98. Id. at ch. XIIl(3).
various constituencies within a representative's own client (like, for
example, when negotiating labour issues on behalf of a trade union or land
claim rights on behalf of a group of native bands), or competing public
interests (like, for example, when negotiating on behalf of a coalition of
community groups or public-interest NGOs) that are not easily reconciled
during a representative's contemplation of a given course of conduct.99
Often traditional conflict of interest rules will assist with these
considerations. However, in situations in which equally valid public
interests are at stake, bona fide contextual and individual reflection may be
the only available tool. Further, client or representative interests regarding
race, gender, culture, and power may, and often do, significantly influence
the negotiation process.l00 Regardless of the interest or choice, the point
here is that active consideration of and deliberation about all interests must
occur.
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS: ZEALOUS ADVOCACY AND CONFLICTING
INTERESTS
Perhaps the two biggest obstacles to my vision of the negotiator-as-
professional are both the dominant zealous advocate model itself and the
potential of irreconcilably competing interests. Because I have already taken
up objections from the zealous advocacy model in the context of
representative negotiations, l" I do not address them further here, other than
briefly to say the following. There is no doubt that the arguments and
considerations that I am advancing in this article are not supported by the
still-dominant model of the zealous advocate. They are therefore neither
uncontroversial nor unproblematic. However, because my vision of the
lawyer-as-negotiator is supported, at least in part, from a theoretical
perspective by both the literature and aspects of current codes of conduct;
and further, as a practical matter, by the intuitions and experiences of both
experienced and novice negotiators, there is clearly both something lacking
about the current models and something appealing about my alternative
model. So while I acknowledge the continued hurdles that dominant,
zealous advocacy models put in the way of my arguments, because of their
own problems, my view is that we need to continue to search for alternative
99. See generally Docherty & Campbell, supra note 6 (considering negotiation in the context
of potentially competing client interests).
100. There is a growing body of literature in the field of negotiation and dispute resolution
dealing with all of these varied and important considerations. See, e.g., HANYCZ, supra note 4; See
also WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 2, at chs. 11-12; MACFARLANE, supra note 4, at 180-215.
101. See, e.g., supra notes 58-60, and accompanying text.
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models. The negotiator-as-professional is one such alternative model that, in
my view, does a better job of capturing both theoretical opportunities and
practical realities of the representative negotiation process.
Equally challenging to my arguments is a further question: what if the
representative is not able to reconcile the competing interests in her mind in
any given negotiation? The simple answer to this question is: just because
the calculus is difficult does not mean that the lawyer should not engage in
it. Resorting to the zealous advocate model for expediency reasons does not
do justice either to it or to alternative models. A slightly more compelling
answer comes from the realm of professional responsibility: lawyers are
bound to consider a broad conception of the competing interests at stake in a
negotiation, both as a competence matter and as an ethical matter. So
professionally, the issue is likely closed. However, this again does not really
deal with the practical - and typical - situation of competing interests. What
should the lawyer do?
A typical situation involves a conflict between the interests of the
representative's client and interests vis-A-vis the representative's bargaining
opposite. 0 2 This conflict -discussed above °3 - is what Gifford and others
identify as a "boundary-role conflict."' 1 4 The obvious answer is to try to
work out with the representative's client - during the preparation stage - a
solution that maximizes the potential of both interests. For example, clients
often do not appreciate the power of a good relationship between
negotiators. Alternatively, they often do not realize, as generally discussed
above, 05 that a good relationship between negotiators does not mean that
their interests are being somehow inadequately protected. 10 6  This initial
hard work with a representative's client, with full disclosure of the
representative's views and interests, will typically resolve many of these
conflicts. However, if a solution cannot be worked out, one option - that I
have argued against 0 7 - is Cochran's preference for dominant client
control.'0 ° The alternative vision that I am suggesting is leaving significant
102. See, e.g., Rubin & Sander, supra note 6, at 505.
103. See generally supra Part III.B.
104. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 5, at 836.
105. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
106. For example, according to Gifford, "The lawyer's role as a moderating influence does not
necessarily mean that she is 'selling-out' the interests of her client." See GIFFORD, supra note 5, at
836-37. See also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., supra note 41 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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control with the lawyer that may ultimately lead, in particularly tough
situations, to a lawyer's withdrawal from a case. While an imperfect
solution, it is a preferable solution to preferring a model that impoverishes
the importance of other interests (a model that potentially forces the lawyer
to check him or herself - and his or her moral compass - at the door on
arrival at work every morning).
Again, the point of my model is not necessarily to solve all potentially
thorny circumstances with a one-size-fits-all approach (that is one of the
dangerously attractive features of the zealous advocate model). No nuanced
model or code, in my view, provides such a solution. For example, as the
CPC recognizes, "[i]nevitably, the practical application of the Code to the
diverse situations that confront an active profession in a changing society
will reveal gaps, ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies." 109 The
negotiator-as-professional model does not necessarily offer further comfort.
What it does offer, however, is a forced nod to reality that takes into account
all that is going on in the representative's mind. It also - in a real way -
takes seriously ethical, public and other interests that current representative
negotiation models do not. And when conflicts do arise, the negotiator-as-
professional is not apologetic, when appropriate, in preferring (with full
disclosure to the client) ethical and public interests over those of his or her
client. This again can align with the spirit of the professional obligations of
lawyers generally. As the CPC provides, in situations of conflict or
competing ethical considerations: "the principle of protection of the public
interest will serve to guide the practitioner to the applicable principles of
ethical conduct .". .. '10 Again, far from irrelevant, a lawyer's "personal
conscience" '' and "sensitive professional and moral judgment""'  will
animate a lawyer's thinking in applying and resolving competing ethical
obligations.
At the end of the day, what the model offers is hopefully a nuanced
calculus of all interests that are on the table. This account should assist in
situating the representative's role vis-A-vis the client and others potentially
involved or interested in a negotiation. In tough cases - when representative
and client interests appear to collide - the model will assist in the difficult
work that is done in advance of the negotiation in the context of discussions
between the representative and his or her client when contemplating a
retainer or, later, when preparing for a negotiation. And finally, if conflicts
109. CPC, supra note 44, at Preface. See also MODEL RULES, supra note 43, at pmbl., para. 9.
See also notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
110. CPC, supra note 44, at Preface.
111. MODEL RULES, supra note 43, at pmbl., para. 7.
112. Id. at para. 9.
398
[Vol. 7: 3, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
persist, it is acknowledged - in these tough cases - that the model may not
ultimately assist with the resolution of those conflicts. However, even then,
the model will succeed in giving adequate authority and support to the
representative who is trying - vis-A-vis the competing interests that are still
at play - to work out what she should do, with knowledge of the client,
including potentially declining to accept or continue with a retainer.
V. CONCLUSION
What I have tried to argue is that representative negotiation models
advanced to-date, like the zealous advocacy model or the "boundary role
position" model lose sight of, or only pay passing lip service to, the many
(and potentially competing) interests that make up the mindset of a
representative negotiator. The negotiator-as-professional model takes
seriously a much more expansive view of potentially competing interests in
the mind of the representative negotiator. Because the different interests
will come up in different ways and may or may not compete in any given
situation, the importance of this model is not that it paints bright lines in
terms of resolving all tensions at all times; but rather that it assists in
identifying the competing interests at play and thereby forces the
representative negotiator to address and potentially resolve competing
interests and conflicts ahead of time rather than simply ignoring them, being
unaware of them, being trapped by them, or being confined by them.
At the end of the day, choices need to be made in the negotiation
process. And they need to be made with the client. Should different
negotiation styles be considered? If so, who has the final say? Based on
whose interests, etc.? What is the desired outcome? Again, whose interests
should drive this calculus? And so on. These choices may also lead to
representatives declining a given client's brief. This is all a healthy part of
the negotiation process. And as I have argued, the alternative - ignoring
these interests and tying the representative's hands in favour of blind zealous
representation - is not a healthy (or professional) way to proceed.
Further, and in any event, representative negotiators should care about
this discussion because the client's case, while clearly central to the
representative's mental calculus, is only one case. The lawyer's approach
and reputation as a representative negotiator in the legal community follow
him or her for an entire career. And while it takes years to develop a solid
reputation as a lawyer and negotiator, it takes about five minutes to destroy
one. So the lawyer clearly has a personal, professional and financial stake in
his or her reputation as a lawyer and negotiator - independent of the client -
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vis-A-vis negotiation style and the bargaining opposite. These same interests
will also likely be at stake for the representative's bargaining opposite. They
therefore need to be considered as meaningful aspects of the processes when
preparing for a negotiation.
The negotiator-as-professional model should find favour in, or at least
be potentially beneficial to, all layers of the legal community. In terms of
clients, to the extent that lawyers are hired to provide expertise, not only
regarding the substance of a given problem, but also on the process of how
that problem should be resolved, resting significant control over that process
in the hands of lawyers should, as a systemic matter, work to the benefit of
clients and their causes. It is also of benefit to clients on the theory that full
communication is not only professionally required," 3 but is also beneficial
to their interests. 114 The model will benefit lawyer representatives
individually and the profession generally, not only in giving lawyers
significant control over how they negotiate, but also in how they feel about
themselves as empowered agents in the building of their clients' cases and
their own careers. Finally, this model will also potentially benefit society as
a whole, both through increased general professional behaviour as well as
specific lawyering conduct that takes seriously social welfare considerations
in the calculus of competing courses of conduct.
As I have readily acknowledged, there may be some cases in which
competing interests do not lend themselves well to resolution, and in those
cases, lawyers will need to think seriously about withdrawal from the case.
But as I have argued, what we are talking about is not simply learning how
to negotiate one case for one client, but rather what a lawyer - and certainly
a representative legal negotiator - does during a significant portion of her
day for a significant portion of her career. Without taking seriously all of
these potentially competing interests, we proceed with a very impoverished
sense of what that career has, does, can and should look like. Without taking
seriously all of these interests, we do not have an adequate answer to my
student who is otherwise dissatisfied and disillusioned with the potential of a
career as a representative negotiator. The negotiator-as-professional model
provides us with a better sense of the lawyer's role that will help to address
some of the theoretical and practical challenges and opportunities of the
representative negotiation process.
113. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 43, at R. 1.4; CPC, supra note 44, at ch. lIl; RPC,
supra note 44, at R. 2.02(1).
114. See, e.g., Docherty & Campbell, supra note 6, at 658. See also CHOMENKI & HART supra
note 51, at 142 (arguing "[glood lawyers are scrupulously honest with their clients. They deliver
good news and bad; they do not withhold unpleasant advice or distort it because the client will find it
unpalatable.").
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